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BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction was conferred on the Utah Supreme Court by Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) (1996). The appeal was timely. The Order
of Dismissal appealed from was initially entered May 28, 1996 (R.
809-806), and amended December 10, 1996. (R. 912-910).

No motions

were filed under Rules 50(a) or (b) , 52(b), or 59 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.

Two motions seeking reconsideration (autho-

rized by Rule 54(b)) were filed.

The first was filed April 12,

1996 (R. 765-763), and denied by the Order of Dismissal dated May
28, 1996. The second Rule 54(b) motion was filed August 16, 1996
(R. 826-825), and denied by the Order of Dismissal dated December
1

10, 1996.

Because of a pending counterclaim which was first

dismissed as part of the December 10, 1996, order, the May 28,
1996, dismissal did not become final until December 10, 1996.
By order entered January 9, 1997, the trial court granted
plaintiffs7 ex parte motion for extension of time to appeal, and
granted a 30 day extension of time. (R. 920-918.) Plaintiffs filed
their notice of appeal on Monday, February 10, 1997. (R. 923-921.)
This

Court

has

jurisdiction

under

Utah

Code

Ann.

§ 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1997).
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Did Triesaults have standing to bring their claims that

they were fraudulently induced to purchase a lot in the PUD?

This

issue was addressed below in plaintiffs' Rule 54(b) Motion for
Order Vacating Dismissal of Personal Claims.
2.

(R. 826-825.)

Did plaintiffs, who were each members of a planned unit

development and who were each personally affected by the loss of
prime common area, have standing to challenge the sale of part of
the PUD common area?

This issue was addressed in Plaintiffs7

Motion to Determine Standing or, in the Alternative, for Leave to
Join Additional Parties.
3.

Did

plaintiffs

(R. 618-617.)
waive

their

personal

claims

(that

Triesaults were fraudulently induced to sign a quit claim deed and
Bakers were fraudulently induced to sign the amended PUD plat) by
stating that their goal in the lawsuit was not to profit personally, but to seek the return of the common ground or its value to

2

the homeowners association?

This issue was addressed below in

plaintiffs' Rule 54(b) Motion for Order Vacating Dismissal of
personal Claims.
4.

(R. 826-825.)

Where the applicable statute and contract required a vote

of three-fourths of the property owners of a planned unit development before selling off a parcel of the common ground, but where no
owners' meeting was held nor a vote ever taken, did the trial court
err in holding that such approval was effectively given because at
least three-fourths of the members stated by affidavit that they
did not wish to join in plaintiffs' challenge of the sale of the
common area?
opposing

This issue was suggested in Wrights' memorandum

plaintiffs' motion

to

reconsider

(R.

788)

and

was

addressed at oral arguments.
The trial court decided this case by summary judgment, and its
ruling is reviewed for correctness, with no deference to the trial
court. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah
1989); Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d
1382, 1385 (Utah 1989).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES OR RULES.
Appellants are not aware of any statutes, rules or cases which
are solely determinative of the issues stated.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature Of The Case.

This is an appeal from a final

judgment in a civil case. The lawsuit sought rescission or damages
arising from a real estate transaction.

3

B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. Plaintiffs

filed their complaint on March 10, 1995. (R. 24-1.l) The complaint
named as defendants the Wrights and QMF, Inc. (sometimes jointly
referred to in this brief as "Wrights") , and the Caspers.

Among

other things, the complaint sought an order restoring certain real
property to a planned unit development, and an award of damages
related to the loss of the property.
pendens.

(R. 26-25.)

Plaintiffs also filed a lis

On June 21, 1995, the parties filed a

stipulation dismissing the claim for restoration of the real
property. (R. 70-68.)

Plaintiffs also released their lis pendens

against the property.

(R. 72-71.)

An Order of Partial Dismissal

was entered June 29, 1995. (R. 75-73.)
Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment (R. 79-78) and
supporting memorandum

(R. 171-080) on July 14, 1995.

Wrights

responded to the motion (R. 191-185) and filed their own motion for
summary judgment. (R. 355-354.)
motion. (R. 507-475.)

Caspers also responded to the

Following oral argument, the trial court

(Judge Lynn Davis) ordered the parties to provide further briefs on
whether plaintiffs had standing. (R. 536.)

Caspers then filed a

motion for summary judgment which included arguments on standing.
(R. 559-558.)
557.)

Wrights filed a memorandum on the issue. (R. 555-

Plaintiffs filed a motion to have the court determine that

The documents in the trial court record are organized in
reverse chronological order, with the result that the index page
numbers on each document run in reverse order.
4

plaintiffs had standing or alternatively to grant leave to join
additional parties. (R. 618-617.)
On January 24, 1996, the trial court (Judge Lynn Davis) ruled
that plaintiffs lacked standing, and that the case would be
dismissed without prejudice unless the plaintiffs within 30 days
joined the homeowners association or the other homeowners. (R. 647645.) Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on February 23, 1996,
naming the other homeowners and the homeowners association as
additional defendants. (R. 730-696.)

Wrights (R. 736-731) and

Caspers (741-737) answered the amended complaint.
As part of the regular rotation of cases in the Fourth
District, the case was assigned to Judge Donald Eyre. On April 4,
1996, Judge Eyre ruled on Caspers' motion for summary judgment.
Apparently unaware that plaintiffs had filed an amended complaint,
Judge Eyre stated the action was dismissed without prejudice
because plaintiffs had failed to join additional parties.

Judge

Eyre also noted that Judge Davis had allowed for joinder of either
the homeowners association or the homeowners, but expressed his
opinion that joinder of the homeowners association would be more
appropriate. (R. 762-760.)
Plaintiffs sought reconsideration of the dismissal on the
ground that Judge Eyre was obviously unaware plaintiffs had filed
an amended complaint. (R. 756-763.) Wrights opposed the reconsideration and submitted affidavits from several homeowners stating
they did not want to be part of any lawsuit. (R. 791-773.)

5

On May

7,

1996, Judge

Eyre

granted

the motion

nonetheless ordered the case dismissed.

to

reconsider, but

The court held that only

the homeowners association had standing to pursue the claims, and
that the affidavits of a majority of the homeowners precluded the
homeowners association from being named as a party to pursue the
claims. (R. 796-792.)

An order of dismissal prepared by Wrights

counsel and dismissing plaintiffs7 case with prejudice2 was entered
May 28, 1996. (R. 809-806.)
On September 1, 1995, without seeking prior leave of court,
Wrights had

filed a counterclaim

against plaintiffs

slander of title and other damages. (R. 346-343.)

claiming
The court

subsequently granted leave to file the counterclaim. (R. 655.) On
August 19, 1996, plaintiffs, through new counsel, filed a motion
for summary

judgment against the counterclaim.

(R. 839-838.)

Plaintiffs also sought an order vacating the dismissal of their
personal claims. (R. 826-825.) Following argument, the trial court
reaffirmed the dismissal of all plaintiffs' claims, but ordered
that the dismissal be without prejudice.
plaintiffs'

motion

for

summary

counterclaim. (R. 904-899.)

The court also granted

judgment

dismissing

Wrights'

The formal order of dismissal was

entered December 10, 1996. (R. 912-910.)

2

Judge Eyre's Memorandum Decision dismissing the case (R. 762760), as well as Judge Davis's prior decision on standing (R. 647645) , had both stated the case would be dismissed without
prejudice.
6

Plaintiffs obtained a 30-day extension of time to appeal (R.
920-918), and filed their notice of appeal on February 10, 1997.
(R. 923-921.) The Supreme Court poured the case over to this Court
on April 30, 1997. (R. 931.)
C.

Statement of Facts.

In 1974, QMF, then a corporation3 owned
Caspers,

purchased

a parcel

of

property

by Wrights and

in Mapleton,

containing a little over a hundred acres. (R. 495.)

Utah,

A 25-acre

portion of that property was preliminarily approved as a planned
unit development ("PUD") in 1974.

Although lots were sold pre-

viously, the formal approval for the PUD occurred in 1980. (R.
494.)

As part of the PUD, approximately two acres were set aside

as common ground. (R. 506.)
For financial and other reasons, Wrights and Caspers determined to amend the PUD documents to reacquire part of the common
ground, which could then be sold as a new lot. (R. 506.)

In order

to maintain the required 25 acres in the PUD, Wrights would convey
other property to the PUD. (Id.) George Wright prepared an amended
plat, Quiet Meadow Farms Planned Unit Development Plat "C," to
accomplish this change.

The amended plat "C" had essentially the

same lots (with some adjustments in lot lines) as the prior plats.
(R. 168.)

3

QMF, Inc. was involuntarily dissolved on December 1, 1987. (R.
729 f 4, 735 J[ 4.)

7

Mapleton City required Wrights and Caspers to obtain the
signatures of all the lot owners to change the plat. (R. 505.)
George Wright obtained the signatures of all the owners except
Steve Hechtle, the prior owner of the Triesault lot.

Hechtle

orally authorized Wright to sign the amended plat, but did not give
a written power of attorney. (R. 444.)

Wright represented to the

homeowners who personally signed the plat, including Bakers, that
"the funds that came from the sale of [the new lot] would be used
for the benefit of the PUD." (R. 128.)
The amended Plat "C" was not recorded until March 16, 1993.
(R. 530.) Prior to recordation, on March 1, 1993, Hechtle had sold
his lot to Triesaults. (Id.) Wrights never sought the signature of
the Triesaults on the amended plat; therefore, neither Hechtle nor
Triesaults ever signed the amended plat.
George Wright had facilitated

the sale to Triesaults by

representing to them, among other things, that the common area
could never be built on, and that the land directly behind the
subject lot was Forest Service land. (R. 414 (Triesault deposition
p. 13).)

Contrary to these representations, the land directly

behind the lot purchased by Triesaults was owned by QMF, not Forest
Service. (R. 313.) Also contrary to these representations, Wright
was in the process of removing some of the common area to be sold
as a building lot.
As part of the plat amendment process, the title company
requested that all the lot owners sign a quit claim deed conveying

8

all the property back to QMF, so the amended plat would reconvey
the property to the lot owners.

Triesaults were now lot owners,

although they had not signed the amended plat, so a quit claim deed
from them was necessary to facilitate the title company's mechanism
for amending the plat.
Wright told

To obtain Triesaults' signatures, George

them the quit claim deed was required

to make

"technical adjustments" to add some unusable hillside land to their
lot. (R.

410 (Triesault deposition p. 45); R. 106-105.)

Wright

did not disclose that the effect of the deed would be to remove 1.8
acres from the heart of the prior common area. (R. 4 09 (Triesault
deposition p. 50).)
Wright used the 1.8 acres along with additional land he owned
to create a lot which was sold for $85,000. George Wright received
approximately $24,000 of that amount.

Approximately $10,000 went

directly to Mr. Casper. Additional amounts were used to pay bills
owed by Wrights' and Caspers' partnership, Quiet Meadow Farms. The
monies were not used for the debts of the PUD.

(R. 167-166.)

Plaintiffs brought this action to recover the value of the
common area which was taken from the PUD and to recover for the
reduced value of their own properties.

(R. 720.) Plaintiffs

testified that they did not seek to profit from the lawsuit, but
only to recover what was taken. (R. 477.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs allege they were induced by defendants' wrongful
acts to personally take actions—Triesaults to buy property and to

9

quit claim that property back to developer, and Bakers to approve
an amendment to the PUD.
personally

to plaintiffs

plaintiff.

These misrepresentations
and

induced

individual

were

acts

by

made
each

Plaintiffs have standing to assert claims based on

those acts.
Plaintiffs also had standing to privately assert claims which
may have been common with other owners in the PUD.

As with a

condominium, an owner in a PUD has private rights and has standing
to assert those rights.

Standing is not defeated by the fact that

other PUD residents may have the same rights.
Plaintiffs did not waive their claims by revealing an advance
intent to donate any fruits of the litigation to the homeowners
association.
The fact that a majority of homeowners expressed, outside of
any meeting, a willingness to approve the amended PUD plat does not
obviate compliance with the formal requirements.

Votes cannot be

taken outside of a meeting; the objecting homeowners have a right
to a formal meeting where their positions can be advocated.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFFS HAD STANDING TO PURSUE
THEIR PERSONAL CLAIMS.
Standing is a jurisdictional issue which considers whether a
person has a sufficient
lawsuit.

interest

in a controversy

to bring a

The Utah Supreme Court has noted that standing issues
10

often turn on the facts of a case and that generalizations about
standing to sue are largely worthless as such." Kennecott Corp v.
Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d 451, 453 (Utah 1985) (citation omitted,
quotation marks omitted). The Court has nonetheless developed the
following test for standing:
1.
We first apply traditional standing
criteria, which require that (a) the interests
of the parties be adverse, and (b) the parties
seeking relief have a legally protectible
interest in the controversy. Plaintiff must
be able to show that he has suffered some
distinct and palpable injury that gives him a
personal stake in the outcome of the legal
dispute.
2.
If the plaintiff has no standing
under the first step, then he may have standing if no one has a greater interest than he
and if the issue is unlikely to be raised at
all if the plaintiff is denied standing.
3.
In unique cases, standing may be
established by a showing that the issues
raised by the plaintiff are of great public
importance
and ought to be judicially
resolved.
Kennecott, 702 P.2d at 454 (citing Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145
(Utah 1983) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
In this case plaintiffs asserted two separate interests:
personal

claims,

and

claims

on

behalf

of

all

homeowners.

Plaintiffs had standing to assert both claims.
Plaintiffs'
plaintiffs.

complaint

alleges

wrongs

personal

to

the

Paragraph 14 of the amended complaint alleges that

George Wright falsely told Jon Triesault that the purpose of
executing a quit claim deed was to make "technical adjustments" in
the plat, rather than truthfully stating that its purpose was to
11

eliminate the most valuable part of common area.

Paragraph 19

alleges that Wright falsely told Bakers that the proceeds from the
sale of the common area would be used for the purpose of improving
and maintaining the common area.
Although all homeowners were harmed by the removal of the
property

from

the

common

area,

plaintiffs

suffered

wrongs

individually, independent from their ownership in the homeowners
association.

These damages are alleged in paragraph 39 of the

complaint:
The plaintiffs, and each of them, were injured
and damaged by the removal of the Common Area
taken by the Defendants Wrights, Casper and
QMF. That injury and damages includes, but is
not necessarily limited to: a) the reduction
of the Common Area; b) the value of the Common
Area taken by the Defendants Wright, Casper
and QMF; c) the likelihood that they would be
unable to pick cherries from the cherry trees;
d) the reduced possibility of access; e) the
reduction in value of their properties as a
result of the access problems described above;
f) the reduction in value of their property as
a result of the property to the east of Quiet
Meadow Farms Planned Unit Development being
owned by private property owners (including
the Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF) rather
than the National Forest Service; g) other
damages as may be proven at trial.
(R. 720.)
The harm to all of the plaintiffs is real, substantial, and
personal.

These are not rights which plaintiffs are attempting to

assert for the benefit of the homeowners association, but rather
rights

which

are

individual

and

12

personal

to

the

plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs, and only plaintiffs, have standing to pursue these
claims.
Plaintiffs also had rights common with all members of the
homeowners association.

Because of the unique nature of a PUD

(similar to a condominium), both an individual owner and the
homeowners association could have standing to assert similar
rights.
Utah

The document creating the PUD did so by reference to the

Condominium

Act,

and

the

property

rights

created

are

functionally the same as for condominiums. The Utah Supreme Court
described those rights as follows:
A condominium owner is the holder of a
hybrid real property interest consisting of
"two distinct tenures, one in severalty and
the other in common; both types, although well
established separately, are inseparably joined
in a condominium."
Brickyard Homeowners' Ass/n Management Comm. v. Gibbons Realty Co. ,
668 P.2d 535, 537 (Utah 1983).

Based on the same analysis, the

court in Rogers & Ford Const. Corp. v. Carlandia Corp., 626 So. 2d
1350 (Fla. 1993), held that an individual unit owner has standing
to sue for defects in the common areas of a condominium, so long as
the interests of the other unit owners are protected.
Plaintiffs had an individual interest in the common areas.
Plaintiffs joined the other homeowners, which would have protected
their

interests.

The district

plaintiffs lacked standing.

13

court erred

in holding that

POINT II
PLAINTIFFS DID NOT WAIVE THEIR CLAIMS.
The trial court was concerned that the plaintiffs "do not
request monetary gain as an outcome of the lawsuit."

(R. 901.)

This "finding" is not supported by the deposition testimony.

Mr.

Triesault testified:
Q.
Mr. Triesault, do you claim that you
and your wife are entitled to the full value
of the common areas that were taken out?
A.

No.

Q.

What would be your claim?

A.
A portion. There is no claim on my
behalf for a monetary gain of any kind. This
is a claim to return the common ground, and
any damages that may have been incurred or
legal expenses, or whatever
else is pled
in
the complaint.
There is no attempt on my part
or I believe on Mr. Baker's part to profit in
any way by this lawsuit, financially.

Q.
You're not seeking to
monetarily at all from the lawsuit?

benefit

A.
Not personally.
If there are
benefits monetarily, they would be given to
the homeowners' association.
R. 477 (italics added).
Plaintiffs

clearly

prayed

for

compensatory

damages, for

punitive damages, for attorney fees, for declaratory relief, and
for other relief as appropriate. The complaint stated a cognizable
claim for that relief.

It is irrelevant what plaintiffs may have

chosen to do with any money awarded.

14

The fact that plaintiffs may

have chosen to donate any money back to the association does not
constitute a waiver of the right to receive that money.
POINT III
PLAINTIFFS SUFFERED A LEGAL INJURY EVEN THOUGH
A MAJORITY OF THE HOMEOWNERS DISAGREED
WITH PLAINTIFFS' POSITION.
The trial court stated:
an

injury

compliance

where
with

the
the

common

"The Court has difficulty in finding
ground

applicable

has

statute,

been
and

disposed
where

of

in

additional

property has been deeded back to compensate for that disposal."
(R. 901.)

The claim that the property had been disposed of in

compliance with statute was based on the court's interpretation of
Utah Code Ann. § 57-8-32 (1996), which permits sale of condominium
property upon the affirmative vote of at least three-fourths of the
unit

owners.

The

trial

court

reasoned

that,

"[a]lthough

no

official vote was taken," because eight of the ten owners in this
case consented to the sale of the common area, those "votes" would
"effectively bind all property owners, including the Plaintiffs."
(R. 901.)
The error in this reasoning is its assumption that a vote can
be taken without a meeting.

The Utah Supreme Court

rejected that concept in the context of a corporation:
A corporation being but an artificial entity,
has but one will, and this will is collected
by the sense of a majority of the directors.
Its will, so collected, directs and controls
the corporate acts. It is therefore important
that every director should have an opportunity
to be heard on all matters affecting the
15

long ago

corporation, so that, through the sense of
all, its best interests may be subserved.
Every director is entitled to the reasoning,
judgment, and advice of every other director
....
[W]here matters to be acted upon call
for deliberation and judgment, all interests
and parties to be affected should have the
benefit of the wisdom and counsel of all those
intrusted with the decision. Although all may
not
concur,
still
the
arguments
and
information of each may modify and affect the
conclusions which otherwise might be reached.
Singer v. Salt Lake City Copper Mfg. Co., 17 Utah 143, 53 P. 1024,
1028 (1898).
The fact that eight of ten owners approved the sale is
therefore of no relevance.

This Court must presume that some of

eight may have been persuaded by the arguments of the two had a
formal meeting occurred.
case.

There was no lawful, proper vote in this

The lack of that vote was not harmless.

An additional error in the trial court's reasoning is found
in the comment that "additional property has been deeded back to
compensate" for the loss of part of the common area.

Land is

unique. Redevelopment Agency v. Mitsui Investment, Inc., 522 P.2d
1370, 1373 (Utah 1974). Plaintiffs characterized the lost property
as the heart of the common area. Although equal acreage was deeded
back to replace the lost property, it certainly was not of equal
value.

The original common area was a generally flat lot planted

with cherry trees, a place where children

could play.

The

replacement property was steep hillside. If the properties were in
fact equivalent, Wrights and Caspers would have had no motivation
to carve out the common area in the first place.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs had standing, both for private wrongs and for
wrongs to all homeowners in the PUD.
their claims.

Plaintiffs did not waive

The dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint should be

reversed.
DATED this

7^

day of July, 1997.

LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: y^f
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN-/
Attorneys for Appellants
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
was mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this
July, 1997.
Richard D. Bradford, Esq.
Bradford, Brady & Rasmussen
389 North University Avenue
P. 0. Box 432
Provo, UT 84603
Thomas W. Seiler, Esq.
Robinson, Seiler & Glazier
80 North 100 East
P. O. Box 1266
Provo, UT 84603
M. Dayle Jeffs, Esq.
Jeffs & Jeffs
90 North 100 East
P. 0. Box 888
Provo, UT 84603

J:\LWS\TRIESAUL.B

17

7^

day of

APPENDIX "A"
Amended Complaint (R. 730-696)
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a

Thomas W. Seiler, #2910
ROBINSON, SEILER & GLAZIER, LC
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
80 North 100 East
P.O. Box 1266
Provo, UT 84603-1266
Telephone: (801) 375-1920

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JON TRIESAULT, ELIZABETH
TRIESAULT, ROGER CLIVE BAKER,
and LYNNETTE JENNIFER BAKER,

AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
QMF, INC., WILLIAM E. CASPER,
JR., SHIRLEY A. CASPER,
GEORGE G. WRIGHT, JANE C.
WRIGHT, STANLEY WAYNE CURTIS,
WILLIAM G. SCHWARTZ, MICHAEL
G. RIEKER, CAROL P. RIEKER,
MARILYN S. PETERSON, Trustee,
and GARY B. PETERSON, Trustee,
of the PETERSON FAMILY TRUST
dated 1/26/89, PATRICIA H.
CLARK, Trustee of the J.D.
AND PATRICIA H. CLARK FAMILY
LIVING TRUST, and QUIET
MEADOW FARMS OWNERS
ASSOCIATION (defined in Quiet
Meadow Farms Planned Unit
Development Agreement), and
RICHARD G. THORPE, and JAN
THORPE, and JOHN DOES 1-10,

Civil No. 950400154
Judge Lynn W. Davis

Defendants.
COME

NOW

the

Plaintiffs, by

and

through

their

counsel of record, Thomas W. Seiler of Robinson, Seiler &
Glazier, LC, and allege as follows:
FACTS
1.

The

Plaintiffs

Jon Triesault

and

Elizabeth

Triesault are residents of Utah County, State of Utah, and
purchased

all of Lot

4, Quiet Meadow Farms

Planned

Unit

Development, amended Plat "A", Mapleton, Utah, according to
the official

Plat

thereof

on

file

in the

Office

of

the

Recorder, Utah County, State of Utah, from Stephen E. Hechtle,
pursuant to that certain Warranty Deed recorded March 1, 1993,
as Entry No. 11594, in Book 3 095, at Page 10, of the Utah
County Recorders Office, a copy of which is attached hereto
and made a part hereof by reference as Exhibit "A" .
2.

The Defendants William E. Casper and Shirley A.

Casper, sometimes hereinafter

collectively

referred

to as

Casper, are residents of the State of California.
3.

The Defendants George G. Wright and Jane C.

Wright, sometimes hereinafter

collectively

referred

to as

Wright, are residents of Utah County, State of Utah.
4.

QMF, Inc., sometimes hereinafter referred to as

QMF, is an association and not a corporation recognized by the
State of Utah, having been involuntarily dissolved on December
1, 1987.
2
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5.

QMF, Inc., is owned and controlled by Casper

and Wright.
6.

No filing has been made with the Department of

Business Regulations of the State of Utah to reinstate QMF,
Inc., since its involuntarily dissolution on December 1, 1987.
7.

The Remaining Individual Defendants (referred

to herein as such) are property owners owning property in
Quiet Meadow Farms Planned Unit Development, and are members
of the Defendant Owners Association.
8.

The

Defendant

Owners

Association

is

an

association created by the Defendants Wright, Casper, and QMF
to govern Quiet Meadow Farms Planned Unit Development.
9.

The Plaintiffs Roger Clive Baker and Lynnette

Jennifer Baker, sometimes hereinafter collectively referred to
as Baker, are residents of Utah County, State of Utah, and are
owners of a home and a lot located in Quiet Meadow Farms
Planned Unit Development.
10.

The Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF are the

developers of Quiet Meadow Farms Planned Unit Development,
Plats "A", "B" and "C", are the developers of the G. Wright
"A" Subdivision which has been created from the Common Area of
Quiet Meadow Farms Planned Unit Development.
11.

Quiet Meadow Farms Planned Unit Development,
3
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Plat

"C",

contains

generally

the

same

lots

(with

some

adjustments in the lot lines) as do Quiet Meadow Farms Planned
Unit Development, Plats "A" and Amended Plat "B".
12.

The Defendants Wright, Casper, and QMF, have

caused approximately 1.8 acres of the Common Area described in
Quiet Meadow Farms Planned Unit Development, Plat "A", and
Amended Plat "B" to be removed from the Common Area to help
create the G. Wright "A" Subdivision.
13.

Attached

hereto

and made

a part

hereof

by

reference as Exhibit "B" is a Quit Claim Deed recorded with
the Office of the Utah County Recorder, Utah County, State of
Utah, as Entry No. 15043, in Book 3103, beginning at Page 574
(hereinafter referred to as the Fraudulent Quit Claim Deed) .
14.

Between the acquisition of Lot 4 as described

on Exhibit "A" and the execution of the Fraudulent Quit Claim
Deed, the Defendants Wright, Casper, and QMF, acting through
the Defendant George Wright, represented

to the

Plaintiff

Triesault that the purpose for executing the Fraudulent Quit
Claim Deed (Exhibit "B") was to make "technical adjustments"
to the Quiet Meadow Farms Planned Unit Development Plat.
15.

The representations referred to in Paragraph 14

above were made on or about the date of execution of the
Fraudulent Quit Claim Deed (Exhibit " B " ) .
4
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16.
known

for

The Defendants Wright, Casper, and QMF had

not

less

than

four

months

prior

to

the

representation described in Paragraph 14 being made, that the
Defendants Wright, Casper, and QMF intended to cause the Quiet
Meadow

Farms

Planned

Unit

Development

Plats

"A" and

"B"

(Amended) to be vacated.
17.

On or about November 12, 1992, the Defendants

Wright, Casper, and QMF represented to Mapleton City, State of
Utah, that all the owners of property located in Quiet Meadow
Farms Planned Unit Development Amended Plat "A" and Amended
Plat

"B"

had

executed

Quiet

Meadow

Farms

Planned

Unit

Development Plat "C".
18.

On November 12, 1992, the Defendants Wright,

Casper and QMF well knew that all of the owners of property in
Quiet Meadow Farms Planned Unit Development Amended Plat "A"
and Amended Plat
Planned

Unit

"B" had not executed Quiet Meadow Farms

Development

Plat

"C"

and

that

such

representation, as made by the Defendants Wright, Casper and
QMF, and each of them, was fraudulent.
19.
through

the

The Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF, acting
Defendant

Plaintiffs Baker that:

George

Wright,

represented

to

the

a) a portion of the Common Area of

Quiet Meadow Farms Planned Unit Development Amended Plat "A"
5

and Amended Plat "B" would be removed;

b) that additional

property would be added to Quiet Meadow Farms Planned Unit
Development in the new Plat "C" to increase the acreage to not
less than 25 acres; and c) that the proceeds from the sale of
the Common Area now included in the G. Wright "A" Subdivision
(hereinafter referred to as the Common Area taken by the
Defendants Wright, Casper, and QMF) would be used for the
purpose of improving and maintaining the Common Area of Quiet
Meadow Farms Planned Unit Development.
20.

Prior to the purchase of their respective lots,

the Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF represented

to the

Plaintiffs that there was access in and-to Quiet Meadow Farms
Planned

Unit

Development

(regardless

of

the

Plat)

from

Mapleton Road, Mapleton City, State of Utah.
21.

In fact, the access which appears on the ground

goes across property owned by the adjoining property owner to
the south, and, upon information and belief, these Plaintiffs
allege that, prior to the initiation of this lawsuit, there
was no written document providing for continued access to
Quiet

Meadow

Farms

Planned

Unit

Development

across

the

southern property owner's ground.
22.

The Common Area taken by the Defendants Wright,

Casper and QMF would have allowed Quiet Meadow Farms Planned
6

Unit Development additional access to Mapleton Road.
23.

The Common Area taken by the Defendants Wright,

Casper and QMF is planted, at least in part, with cherry
trees.
24.

Immediately prior to the purchase of their lot,

the Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF (through the Defendant
George Wright) represented to the Plaintiffs Triesault that
the Plaintiffs Triesault would be entitled to pick cherries in
perpetuity from the cherry trees, which exist on the Common
Area taken by the Defendants.
25.

After the commencement of this lawsuit, the

Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF sold the Common Area taken
by the Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF to third parties (Mr.
and Mrs. Croshaw).
26.

Upon information and belief, the Common Area

taken by the Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF is alleged to
be valued at between $61,200 and $85,000. The actual value is
susceptible to proof before the Court.
27.

At the time the Plaintiffs Triesault purchased

their lot pursuant to Exhibit

"A", the Defendants Wright,

Casper and QMF represented to the Plaintiffs Triesault that
the property immediately to the east of Quiet Meadow Farms
Planned Unit Development was owned by the National Forest
7
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Service.

In fact, the property adjoining to the east is not

owned by the National Forest Service, but is owned by private
property owners, including the Defendants Wright, Casper and
QMF.
28.

The Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF have

maintained two metal buildings in the southwesterly portion of
the Common Areas, which they have used for their exclusive use
to the detriment of these Plaintiffs in an amount to be proven
at trial.
29.

The Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF

have

admitted that the Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF should
have disclosed to the Plaintiffs Triesault their intention to
remove the Common Area taken by the Defendants Wright, Casper
and QMF from Quiet Meadow Farms Planned Unit Development prior
to

convincing

the

Plaintiffs

Triesault

to

execute

the

Fraudulent Quit Claim Deed.
30.

The Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF have made

fraudulent misrepresentations to the Plaintiffs as set forth
above, including, but not necessarily limited to:
a.

The request that the Fraudulent Quit Claim

Deed be signed so that the Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF
could make technical adjustments to the Quiet Meadow Farms
Planned Unit Development property lines;
8

b.

That the Plaintiffs Triesault could pick

cherries on the Common Area taken by the Defendants Wright,
Casper and QMF in perpetuity;
c.
Meadow

Farms

That the property to the east of Quiet

Planned

Unit

Development

was

owned

by

the

National Forest Service;
d.

That the access to Quiet Meadow

Farms

Planned Unit Development to Mapleton Road was secure;
e.

That the proceeds from the sale of the

Common Area taken by the Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF
would go to improve and maintain Quiet Meadow Farms Planned
Unit Development Common Area;
forth above;
Fraudulent

and other representations set

all of which are referred to hereinafter as the
Misrepresentations,

and

were

known

by

the

Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF to be false at the time they
were made.
31.

Each of the Fraudulent Misrepresentations made

by the Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF were representations
concerning presently existing material facts.
3 2 . The Fraudulent Misrepresentations were known by
the Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF to be false, or were
made by the Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF knowing that the
Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF had insufficient knowledge
9
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upon which to base such representations.
33.

The Fraudulent Misrepresentations were made by

the Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF for the purpose of
inducing the Plaintiffs to act upon them.
34.

The

Plaintiffs

Triesault

acted

upon

the

Fraudulent Misrepresentations by executing the Fraudulent Quit
Claim Deed, Exhibit "B".
35.

The Plaintiffs Baker acted upon the Fraudulent

Misrepresentations of the Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF by
executing

Plat

Development

"C"

of

Quiet

and executing

the

Meadow

Farms

Fraudulent

Planned

Quit

Claim

Unit
Deed

(Exhibit «B").
36.

The

Plaintiffs,

and

each

of

them,

acted

reasonably and in ignorance of the falsity of the Fraudulent
Misrepresentations.
37.

The Plaintiffs, and each of them, did in fact

rely upon the Fraudulent Misrepresentations in executing the
Fraudulent

Quit Claim Deed

(Exhibit

"B")

and,

as to the

Plaintiffs Baker, in executing Quiet Meadow Farms Planned Unit
Development Plat "C".
38.
to

execute

The Plaintiffs, and each of them, were induced

the

documents

referred

to

in

the

preceding

paragraphs as a result of the Fraudulent Misrepresentations of
10
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Defendants Wright, Casper, and QMF.
39.

The Plaintiffs, and each of them, were injured

and damaged by the removal of the Common Area taken by the
Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF.

That injury and damage

includes, but is not necessarily limited to: a) the reduction
of the Common Area;

b) the value of the Common Area taken by

the Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF; c) the likelihood that
they would be unable to pick cherries from the cherry trees;
d) the reduced possibility of access;

e) the reduction in

value of their properties as a result of the access problems
described above;

f) the reduction in value of their property

as a result of the property to the east of Quiet Meadow Farms
Planned Unit
owners

Development

being

owned by private

(including the Defendants Wright,

rather than the National Forest Service;

Casper

property
and

QMF)

g) other damages as

may be proven at trial.
40.

As part of the scheme and artifice to mislead

the Plaintiffs, the Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF (through
the Defendant George Wright) represented to Mapleton City on
or about November 12, 1992, that all of the owners of the
property

described

as

Quiet

Meadow

Farms

Planned

Unit

Development Plat "C" had executed said Plat, when in fact at
least

Stephen

E. Hechtle, who1 was

an owner

of

property

11
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contained thereon, had not signed the said Plat.
41.

Such misrepresentation was necessary in order

to present said Plat to the Planning Commission of Mapleton
City

for

Planning

Commission

approval,

which

Planning

Commission approval appears to have been obtained on or about
November 12, 1992.
42.

It was necessary for the Defendants Wright,

Casper, and QMF to make fraudulent misrepresentations to the
Plaintiffs to induce the Plaintiffs to execute the Fraudulent
Quit Claim Deed in order to obtain approval from the City
Council of Mapleton City for the vacation of Plat "A" Amended
and Plat "B", Quiet Meadow Farms Planned Unit Development,
which Plat Vacation Notice was executed by Ernest

"Skip"

Predmore on or about March 11, 1993, the date of execution of
the Fraudulent Quit Claim Deed.
43.

In addition to the Plaintiffs, the Defendants

Stanley Wayne Curtis, William G. Schwartz, Michael G. Rieker,
Carol P. Rieker, Marilyn S. Peterson, Gary B. Peterson, and
Patricia H. Clark executed the Fraudulent Quit Claim Deed.
Upon information and belief, the Plaintiffs allege that the
one or more of the Fraudulent Misrepresentations made by the
Defendants Wright, Casper
George

Wright)

were

made

and QMF
to

the

(through

the

remaining

Defendant
individual

12
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Defendants.

This allegation is based, in part, upon the

testimony of George Wright to the effect that the Defendant
George Wright told everyone he talked to that the funds that
came from the sale of Lot 1, the G. Wright Subdivision, Plat
"A", would be used for the benefit of the Quiet Meadow Farms
Planned Unit Development.
44.

Upon information and belief, the Plaintiffs

allege that some of the parties executing the Fraudulent Quit
Claim Deed did not personally appear before the notary public
to execute the Fraudulent Quit Claim Deed.

The Defendants

Wright, Casper and QMF knew that one or more of the signators
on the Fraudulent Quit Claim Deed had not personally appeared
before the notary to sign the Fraudulent Quit Claim Deed, nor
to

acknowledge

allegation

is

that

they

based,

had

in part,

executed
on

the

the

same.

testimony

This
of

the

Defendant George Wright to the effect that the Defendants
Rieker,

the

Plaintiffs

Baker,

the

Defendants

Clark,

the

Defendants Peterson, the Defendants Curtis, the Defendants
Schwartz, and the Defendants Wright each signed the Quiet
Meadow

Farms

Planned

Unit

Development

Plat

"C",

which

signatures were not affixed in front of a notary, contrary to
the representation contained on Quiet Meadow Farms Planned
Unit Development Plat "C".
13

45.

The Plaintiffs are entitled to punitive damages

against the Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF in the amount of
the value of the Common Area taken by the Defendants Wright,
Casper and QMF, which value is $250,000 or more as is proven
at trial.
46.

The Plaintiffs are entitled

to recover

all

costs incurred herein and, including, but not limited to,
reasonable attorney's fees, which reasonable attorney's fees
are in the amount of $4 0,000 or more as is proven at trial.
47.

The Defendants Stanley Wayne Curtis, William G.

Schwartz, Michael G. Rieker, Carol P. Rieker, Marilyn S.
Peterson, Gary B. Peterson, Patricia H. Clark, Richard G.
Thorpe

and Jan Thorpe, hereinafter

Remaining

Individual

Defendants, claim an interest in and to portions of the real
property described in this Complaint, and are members of the
Defendant Owners Association.
48.

The

Defendant

Owners

Association

is

an

association established by the Defendants Wright, Casper and
QMF, of which the Plaintiffs and all individual Defendants are
members, which was established for the purposes set forth in
the Quiet Meadow Farms Planned Unit Development Agreement,
attached as Exhibit "C" and incorporated herein by reference.
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49.

Pursuant to Exhibit "C", the Quiet Meadow Farms

Planned Unit Development was created pursuant to the Mapleton
City Zoning Ordinance and the Utah Condominium Ownership Act,
each of which are incorporated herein by reference.
50.

Upon information and belief, the Plaintiffs

allege that the provisions of the second sentence of paragraph
1 of Exhibit

"C" have not been enforced

as property has

changed hands in Quiet Meadow Farms Planned Unit Development.
51.
Association,

The

business

including

of

the

the

Defendant

operation,

Owners

maintenance

and

improvement of the Common Areas of the Quiet Meadow Farms
Planned Unit Development shall be conducted by an Executive
Committee consisting of three members to be elected by the
owners.
52.

In fact, the Executive Committee has been made

up of the various homeowners who are named as parties in this
action.
53.

The

Executive

Committee

has

chosen

not

to

pursue the Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF for the damages
alleged in this Complaint, and, accordingly, the Remaining
Individual Defendants and the Defendant Owners Association
have been named to place all parties before the Court.

15
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54 .
Court

The Plaintiffs are entitled to an Order of the

determining

that

the

Owners

Association

and

the

Remaining Individual Defendants have failed and refused to
pursue the claim for damages set forth herein, and, pursuant
to

the

Court's

Ruling

of

January

24,

1996,

they

are

indispensable parties who must be brought into the action.
55.

The Plaintiffs are entitled to an Order of the

Court determining the interests of all parties who are members
of the Owners Association as to the judgment which will be
awarded upon the successful completion of this action.
56.

The Plaintiffs are furthermore entitled to an

Order of the Court determining the rights of all parties in
and to the funds, the access, the metal building, and the
punitive damages described throughout this complaint.
WHEREFORE,

the

Plaintiffs

pray

for

judgment

as

follows:
1.

For

an

amount

to

be

proven

at

trial

representing the reasonable value of the Common Area taken by
the Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF.
2.

For punitive damages in the amount of $250,000.

3.

For an Order of

the

Court

determining

the

reduction in value of the Plaintiffs' property as a result of

16

the

Fraudulent

Misrepresentations

made

by

the

Defendants

Wright, Casper and QMF, including, but not limited to: a) the
reduction of the Common Area; b) the value of the Common Area
taken by the Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF;

c) the

likelihood that they would be unable to pick cherries from the
cherry trees;

d) the reduced possibility of access;

e) the

reduction in value of their properties as a result of the
access problems described above; f) the reduction in value of
their property as a result of the property to the east of
Quiet Meadow Farms Planned Unit Development being owned by
private property owners

(including the Defendants Wright,

Casper and QMF) rather than the National Forest Service;

g)

other damages as may be proven at trial.
4.
but

not

For all costs incurred herein and including,

limited

to,

reasonable

attorney's

fees,

which

reasonable attorney's fees shall be in the amount of $40,000
or more as is proven at trial.
5.
interests

of

For

determination

the Remaining

by

the

Individual

Court

as

Defendants

to

the

and

the

Defendant Owners Association in and to the damages awarded
hereby.
6.

For such other and further relief as to the

17

Court may seem just and proper under the circumstances.
DATED this ^ 7

day of February, 1996.
ROBINSDN, SEILER & GLAZIER, LC

Thomas W. Seiler
Plaintiffs' Addresses:
Jon and Elizabeth Triesault
18 Quiet Meadow Lane
Mapleton, UT 84664
Roger & Lynnette Baker
23 Quiet Meadow Lane
Mapleton, UT 84664
G:\SEILER\TRIESAULCOM
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I

hereby

certify

that

correct

foregoing were mailed, postage prepaid, this

copies
£3

of

day of

February, 1996, addressed as follows:
Richard D. Bradford
BRADFORD, BRADY & RASMUSSEN, PC
389 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 432
Provo, UT 84603
M. Dayle Jeffs
Jeffs & Jeffs
90 North 100 East
Provo, UT 84 603
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8,00
1
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Recorded at Request of_
nL

_. M. Fee Paid $_
Dep. Book_

by-

Page-

Ref.:

_ Address,.

Mail tax notice to_

WARRANTY DEED
STEPHEN E. UECIITLE aka STEVEN E. IIECHTLE *
of

San J o s e

grantors

, County oiyj*^**otyJ^^^

<^w^c^
UUc*4

j cCAAf ? r ^ hereby
f^S gt at at et e0 oj[

CONVEY and WARRANT to J ( ) N TRIESAULT and ELIZABETH TRIESAULT, husband and
w i f e , as J o i n t T e n a n t s , with f u l l r i g h t of s u r v i v o r s h i p

2136 Spring Oaks D r . , S p r l n g v l l l e , Utah 84663
$ 1 0 . 0 0 and o t h e r good and v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n

of

the following described tract
State of Utah:

of land in

Utah

grantee
for the sum of
- DOLLARS,
County,

Lot A, Quiet Meadow Farms Planned Unit Development, Amended P l a t "A",
Mapleton, Utah, a c c o r d i n g to the o f f i c i a l p l a t t h e r e o f on f i l e in t h e
o f f i c e of the REcorder, Utah County, Utah.
S u b j e c t to Easements and Covenants of

record.

4>v? *%$K
Oi,
*

WITNESS, the hands of said grantois , this
25th
February
, A. D. 19 93

£//esM

.

•

•

day of

/tt/J^£/LM=\

My commission expffes.
BLAMK # » O t — WAnriANrr Dcei>—<D G E M

P R I N T I N G G O . — SALT LAKE

•000

710

EHT11594

C A L I F O R N I A ALL-PURPOSE A C K N O W L E D G M E N T
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County of_

&evjv< ClaVzv

fU*v^ry<3r, 1^13
On

personally appeared ^ t b ^ * * - * *
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1 OPTIONAL SECTION 1

}

CAPACITY CLAIMED BY SIGNER
Though statute does not require the Notary to
fill In the data below, doing so may prove
Invaluable to persons relying on the document.

nJ^NDIVIDUAL

NAME. TITLE OfcOFFICER t . G . 'JANE fX)E. WOTARY PUBLIC*

•

CORPORATE OFFICER(S)

•

PARTNER(S) • LIMITED
j~2 GENERAL

b
TITIE(S)

NAME(S) OF SIGNER(S)

I

PG

NO 5193

»<y ftuJr(?/C

before me,.

BK 3 0 9 5

• personally known to me - OR - Tj3^>roved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence
f
to be the person^) whose name(s/) ls/ate-1
subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that he/ahe/they executed
the same in his/her/their authorized
capacityfrest, and that by his/her/their
signature^ on the instrument the person^,

•

ATTORNEY-IN-FACT

•

TRUSTEE(S)

Q GUARDIAN/CONSERVATOR
•

OTHER:

per6on(6) acted, executed the instrument.
OFFICtAL SEM,
A K NIGAM
NOTARY PUBLIC - CALIFORNIA

SIGNER IS REPRESENTING:
NAME OF PERSON(S) OR ENTITY(IES)

WITNESS my hand and official seal.

SANTA C I A R A COUNTY
My comm. expires MAR 27, 1993
SIGN
AT U R E I ^ W G T A R Y
SNATURETJPWGTAR

OPTIONAL SECTION
THIS CERTIFICATE MUST BE ATTACHED TO
THE DOCUMENT DESCRIBED AT RIGHT:

TITLE OR TYPE OF DOCUMENT.
NUMBER OF PAGES

Though the data requested here is not required by law.
it could prevent Iraudulent rentlachment of this form.
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[NaYrttxdy
DATE OF DOCUMENT.

SIGNER(S) OTHER THAN NAMED ABOVE _
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iVffw^,
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RECORDED FOR SECURITY TITLE AHO AeST*»*.T
QUIT-CLAIM DEED
STANLEY WAYNE C U R T I S , WILLIAM G. SCHWARTZ, JON TRIESAULT a n d
ELIZABETH TRIESAULT, h i s w i f e , GEORGE G. WRIGHT a n d JANE C . WRIGHT,
h i s w i f e , MICHAEL G. RIEKER a n d CAROL P . RIEKER, h i s w i f e , ROGER
CLIVE BAKER a n d LYNNETTE JENNIFER BAKER, h i s w i f e , MARILYN S .
PETERSON, T r u s t e e a n d GARY B . PETERSON, T r u s t e e o f t h e PETERSON
FAMILY TRUST, d a t e d 1 / 2 6 / 8 9 , a n d PATRICIA H. CLARK, T r u s t e e of t h e
J . D . a n d P a t r i c i a H. C l a r k F a m i l y L i v i n g T r u s t
grantees

of
Mapleton
QUIT-CLAIM to
of

, County of
QMF, INC.

Utah , State of Utah, hereby

21 Quiet Meadow Lane, Mapleton, Utah

84664

grantee

for the sum of One Dollar and no/lOOs
the following described tract of-land in
State of Utah:

Utah

County,

Amended Plat "A", Quiet Meadow Farms Planned Unit Development
and Plat "B" , Amended Quiet Meadow Farms Planned Unit Development,
according to the official plats thereof on file in the office of
the Recorder, Utah County, Utah.
Witness the hands of the grantors, this
llth
day of March
1993
, A.O,—on thousand nine hundred and ninety three.

G&L\
Life ly<C\h&.^.
. <_"

\Tru*tcc. rt'fcrv/n r"3i»»n«t TTuST

r2nU>
./Ctsu>
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06 1995
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Trustee
STATE OF

UTAH

)
) SS

COUNTY OF

UTAH

)

On t h e l l c h
day of
March
, 19 93 , p e r s o n a l l y a p p e a r e d
b e f o r e me
MARILYN s . PETERSON and GARY 3 . PETERSON T r u s t e e * u n d e r t h e
PETERSON FAMILY
T r u s t d a t e d t h e 26ch
day o f
January
, 19 29 , t h e s i g n e r o f t h e w i t h i n i n s t r u m e n t , who
d u l y a c k n o w l e d g e d t o me t h a t t h e y e x e c u t e d t h e same p u r s u a n t t o
and i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e p o w e r s v e s t e d i n them by t h e t e r n s o f
s a i d T r u s t Agreement.

Notary
My C o m m i s s i o n

Mon M a r

Expires:

06 1995

7/1/96

Pubiic

Residing

at:
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STATE

OF
) SS

COUNTY

OF

)

UTAH

On t h e
11th day of
March
#199 3 , p e r s o n a l l y
appeared before we MICHAEL G. RIEKER and CAROL P. RIEKER, his wife
, a
s i g n e r s of the f o r e g o i n g i n s t r u m e n t , who duly acknowledged t o me
t h a t t h e Y e x e c u t e d t h e same.
• ^ ^ ^ ^

Notary P u b l i c
Residing
in
Provo
Hy Commission E x p i r e s :
7/1/96

STATE

OF

UTAH

)
) SS

COUNTY OF

^AH

)

March
On t h e
11th d a y 0 f
199
personally
a p p e a r e d b e f o r e me ROGER CLIVE BAKER and LYNNETTE JENNIFER BAKER, h i s w
s
wife"
s i g n e r o f the f o r e g o i n g instrument, who duly acknowledged t o me

that

the y

executed t h e same
^g^AAJ^=^-

Notary P u b l i c
R e s i d i n g i n Provo
es:

7/1/96

Mon M a r

06 1995
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STATE GF ITt^
COUNTY OF

y
) ss
)

UTAH

On the lich
day of
March
appeared before me STANLEY WAYNE CURTIS
signer of the foregoing instrument, who duly
that
he. executed the same.

,199 3 ,

personally
, a
acknowledged t o me

WESTON GAflHETT
Provo. UQft W10S
My Commission Expires: M - 9 6

SUi ui vun

My C o m m i s s i o n

3j

Notary Public
Residing
in
Provo

Expires:

STATE OF

UTAH

COUNTY OF

UTAH

)
)ss
)

On t h e 11th d a y o f
March
199 3 , p e r s o n a l l y
/
appeared before me WILLIAM G. SCHWARTZ
, a
signer of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged t o me
that
he
executed the same.
WESTouavwm $
ttbsCavr
»Canmta»n£^witM-58
SaxtfUofl

B
91
Jfl

,*£=£*&£

Notary Public
Residing in
Provo

7/1/96
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Trustee
STATE OF

UTAH

COUNTY OF

OTAH

On the
before me

j
) ss
)

Uth

Harch

day of

PATRICIA H. CLASK
J.D. and PATRICIA !!. CLARX FAMILY JIVING

, 19^3
Trust

t

personally appeared
, Trustee under the

dated the

day of

, 19
, the signer of the within instrument, who
duly acknowledged to me that they executad the same pursuant to
ind in accordanca with the powers vested in them by the terms of
said Trust Agreement.
WE5T0NGAAR£rT
S5EJ3C5TW

£j^C*n^

rroro.iw> &*eo3 ^
&fr Conmtawn £xpva: M-98

Notary

«=s**g3..pjL.fCCKZ

Public

assssssssssssssssssssss
My Commission E x p i r e s :

Mon

Mar

06

7

A/96

1 9 9 5 1 7 : 2 9 UTAH
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Provo, Utah
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) ss
)

COUNTY OF UTAK

On t h e

llth

appeared before me

day of
J0N

March

,199] ,

personally

TRIESAULT and ELIZABETH TRIESAULT, his wife

signer8 of the foregoing instrument,
c
that
h e 7 e x e c u t e d t h e same.

who d u l y

acknowledged

Notary P u b l i c
Residing
in

f

a

t o me

Provo

7/1/96

STATE OF

UTAH

)
) SS

COUNTY OF UTAH

)

llch
March
On t h e
day of
, 1993 , p e r s o n a l l y
a p p e a r e d b e f o r e me GEORGE G. WRIGHT and JANE C. WRIGHT, his wife
( a
s i g n e r ^ o f t h e f o r e g o i n g i n s t r u m e n t , who d u l y a c k n o w l e d g e d t o me
that
they
e x e c u t e d t h e same.

'A^£

Notary Public
Residing in_

3=32^ nxxxr
Provo

ires:
7/1/96

Mon

Mar

06

1995

17:30
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QUIET MEADOW FARMS
PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT
AGREEMENT
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The undersigned, who are all the owners of the real property described in Exhibit
A to thii Agreement have agreed to create a planned unit development within the meaning
of Maphton City Zoning Ordinance and the Utah Condominium Ownership Act. A set
of plans for the planned unit development, to be known as Quiet Meadow Farms
(hereinafter called the "Development"), is attached as Exhibit B to this Agreement. The
owners have agreed to maintain and manage the common areas of the Development
according to the terms of this Agreement as set forth below;
1.

O
CO

Organization and Membership,

The owners hereby organize themselves as the Quiet Meadow Farms Owners
Association (hereinafter called the "Association"), an unincorporated association. All
owners of property in the Development shall be members of the Association, and no
member may sell or transfer his property unless the new owner agrees in writing to become
a member of the Association.
2.

Executive Committee.

The business of the Association, including the operation, maintenance and
improvement of the common areas of the Development shall be conducted by an executive
committee consisting of three members to be elected by the owners.
3.

Annual Meetings of the Association.

Meetings of the members of the Association shall be held at least once
per year on the first Monday in May, or such other convenient time as three-fourths
of the owners may agree upon. At the annual meeting the members shall receive a report
of the business of the Association and elect the executive committee of the Association.
Each owner shall have three votes and may cast one or more of such votes for any
candidate.
4.

Covenants to Run with the Land.

This Agreement shall be recorded as a deed covenant and all covenants,
restrictions, limitations, and conditions provided in this Agreement shall run with the land
owned in common by the owners and shall be binding on the owners whose signatures
appear on this document, ail additional owners who acquire an interest in the common
areas of the Development, and their successors in interest.

3
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5.

Change of Ownership.

The executive committee shall require any new owner to furnish evidence
of ownership and sign a written agreement agreeing to be bound by this Agreement before
recognizing a new owner's claim to use of the common areas. No interest in the common
areas may be transferred without the transfer of ownership of a homesite in the
Development.
6.

Insurance.

The executive committee shall maintain insurance in an amount equal to
estimated replacement cost of common facilities.
7.

Assessments.

Each owner shall pay his proportionate share of common expenses.
Payment shall be made at such times and in such amounts as the executive committee
shall determine in accordance with this Agreement and the by-laws of the Association.
The Association shall have a lien upon the individual homesitcs and any
improvements thereon for the payment of common expenses as provided in Paragraph
8 of this Agreement. Failure to use the common facilities shall not exempt any owner
from liability for his share of common expenses.
Each owner shall pay his allocated portion of common expenses for
maintenance and operation of common areas according to an annual schedule to be
prepared by the executive committee. Assessments for construction of new facilities costing
in excess of $1,500 shall require the approval of 75% of the homesite owncn. This
shall not apply in the case of reconstructing facilities destroyed through a casualty loss
fully covered by insurance.
Any assessment unpaid within thirty days after the due date shall bear
interest at the rate of 10 percent.
The executive committee shall have full discretion to prescribe the manner
of operating and maintaining the common areas and the cash requirements for doing so.
Every reasonable determination by the executive committee shall be final and conclusive
as to the owncn and every reasonable expenditure shall be deemed necessary and properly
made.
8.

Liens.

Each monthly assessment and each special assessment shall be personal debts
and obligations of the owner against whom they are assessed at the time assessment is
made and shall be collectible as such. Suit to recover a money judgment for unpaid
common expenses shall be maintainable without foreclosing or waiving the lien securing
the same. The amount of any assessment, whether regular or special, assessed to the

-2-
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owner of any homeiite, including reasonable attorney's fees, shall become a lien upon
such homeiite and improvements and the owner's interest in common areas upon recording
a notice of the assessment u provided by the Utah Condominium Ownership Act.
The lien for nonpayment of common expenses shall have priority over ail
other liens and encumbrances, recorded or unrecorded, except only:
(a) Tax and special assessment liens, and
(b) Enaunbrances on the homesite and owners' interest in common areas
recorded prior to the date such notice is recorded, which by law would be a lien prior
to subsequently recorded encumbrance.
The lien for nonpayment of assessment may be enforced by sale or
foreclosure of the owner's interest by the executive committee or by a bank, trust company
or title insurance company authorized by the executive committee, such sale or foreclosure
to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of law applicable to the exercise of
powers of sale or foreclosure in deeds of trust or mortgages or in any manner permitted
by law.
9.

Agreement Enforceable by City.

This Agreement, when executed by the owners, and approved by the City
Attorney of the City of MapJeton, Utah, shall be filed with the Utah County Recorder
and shall be enforceable by the City of Mapleton, as provided in the Zoning Ordinance
of the City of Mapleton. These sections permit the City to treat a breach of this Agreement
as a violation of the Mapleton City ordinances. The City also has the right to tn:at
a failure to maintain the common areas as a public nuisance and the City may use any
remedy provided by law to abate such nuisance. The owners hereby specifically agree
that the covenants set forth in this agreement may be enforced by the City should the
owners fail to do so.
10. Serv/cej Rendered by City.
The owners agree that if the City of Mapleton should be hindered in
rendering fire, police or other city services by the locked gate at the entrance t^ the
Development or other special features of the Development, the owners shall not hold
the City liable provided reasonable efforts have been made to furnish the service in question.
11. Use Restrictions,
Use of property in the Development shall be subject to the following
provisions:
(a) Each homesite shall be used only for a private single family residence
and shall be occupied only by an individual family and its servants, guests, lessees or
tenants. No homesite may be subdivided nor may an owner sell or transfer less than
all hi* interest in his homesite and common areas.

3"
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(b) The common areas sha!! be used only by the owners, their families,
guests and lessees. No commercial use of the common areas may be permitted.
(c) All homesites and the common areas shall be kept in a clean and
sanitary condition. No rubbish or refuse shall be allowed to accumulate. No unlawful
use of any part of the Development shall be permitted.
(d) No signs, notices or advertisements shall be
Development without the consent of the executive committee.
12. Administrative

Rules and

displayed

in

the

Regulations.

The executive committee shall have the power to adopt and establish by
resolution such building, management and operational rules as it may deem necessary for
the maintenance, operation, management and control of the project. The committee may,
from time to time by resolution, alter, amend and repeal such rules. When a copy of
any rule has been furnished to the owners, the rule shall be binding upon the owners.
13.

Amendment.

This Agreement, the by-laws of the Association and the rules adopted by
the executive committee may be amended by a vote of not less than three-fourths of
the owners. Any amendment to this Agreement shall be filed for recording with the
Utah County Recorder.
14. Right of First

Refusal.

When an owner desires to sell his interest in the Development, he shall
give notice to the executive committee of the owner's intention to sell. The notice shall
include the name and address of the prospective purchaser and the price and terms of
the proposed sale. At any time within ten days of the receipt of the notice the executive
committee may notify the owner that the Association or a member of the Association
elects to purchase the owner's interest at the price and on the terms specified. If the
owner is not notified within ten days that the Association elects to purchase the owner's
interest, the owner is free to sell to the prospective purchaser at the price and on the
terms specified. If the owner fails to complete the sale to the designated purchaser, the
owner shall again tender his interest to the executive committee before making any sale.
15. Agent for Service of

Q p n r g e G.

Fri

Service of
Wright

Jan

05

Process.

process upon the Association may be made by serving
whose address is: 2 1 3 7 E a s t 4 0 0 N o r t h , M a p l e t o n ,
Utah, 84663
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16. Miscellaneous Provisions,
(a) Invalid Provisions. In the event that one or more of the phrases,
sentence*, clauses, parasnpht or subparagraph! contained in this Agreement are determined
to be invalid or operate to render this Agreement invalid, this Instrument shall be construed
is if such invalid phrase, sentence, clauae, paragraph or subparagraph had not been inserted
so far as legally possible.
(b) Interpretation. The singular, wherever used herein, shall be construed
to Include! the plural when applicable, and a given gender shall be deemed to include
partnerships, corporations, individuals, and men or women where necesaary and applicable.
(c) Topical Headings, The topical headings of the paragraphs contained
in this Agreement are for convenience only and do not define, limit or construe the contents
of the paragraphs or of this Agreement.
17. Waiver.
No provisions contained in this Agreement shall be deemed to have been
waived by rwon of any failure to enforce it, irrespective of the number of violations
which may occur.
18. Effective Date.
This Agreement shall take effect on the date it is recorded in the office
of the Utah County Recorder.
Executed this

Fri

Jan

05

1996

S

day of

09:51

IV8O

UTAH

COUNTY

RECORDERS

OF(Kl£k

APPENDIX "B"
Memorandum Decision, 7 May 1996 (R. 796-792)

FILED

Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

CARMAl2 B. SMITH, Clerk
*f

Deputy
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JON TRIESAULT, ELIZABETH
TRJJESAULT, ROGER CLIVE BAKER, and
LYNNETTE JENNIFER BAKER,
Plaintiffs/Counterclaim Defendants,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CASE NO. 950400154
DATE: May 7, 1996

vs.

JUDGE DONALD J. EYRE

QMF, INC., WILLIAM E. CASPER, JR.,
SHIRLEY A. CASPER, GEORGE G,
WRIGHT, JANE C. WRIGHT, and JOHN
DOES 1-10,
Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs.

This matter came before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider, filed on
April 12, 1996. The Court, having received and reviewed the motion, memorandum in
support, memorandum in opposition, and having reviewed the applicable law, now makes the
following remarks:
1.

Upon review of its April 4, 1996 Memorandum Decision, the Court finds that

Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider is the functional equivalent of a motion pursuant to U. R. C.
P., Rule 60 (b), requesting relief from a mistaken judgment or order, and grants said motion.
See Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son. 808 P.2d 1061, 1063-65 (Utah 1991).
2.

The Court regrets any confusion its previous memorandum decisions may have

caused the parties in the above matter regarding issues related to standing and joinder of
indispensable parties.
3.

The Court, in its "Ruling on Issue of Whether Plaintiffs Have Standing," dated

January 24, 1996, was ". . .concerned with the issue of standing in this case and whether all
the necessary parties have been included in the action" (emphasis added). The Court then
Memorandum Decision
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entered into a discussion of joinder of persons pursuant to Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure but neglected to address the standing issue.
4.

The Court recognizes that Plaintiffs, pursuant to the recommendations of this Court,

attempted to cure the issue regarding whether all the necessary parties have been included in
the action by joining various parties as Defendants on February 23, 1996, when Plaintiffs
filed an amended complaint with this Court. The Court's finding, in the Memorandum
Decision dated April 4, 1996, that the "Plaintiffs have not joined any indispensable parties"
was therefore a mistake.
5.

Nevertheless, Plaintiffs' joinder of indispensable parties does not cure its standing

deficiencies. The issue of standing has always been, and still remains to be, Plaintiffs
largest obstacle in bringing this action. It was the issue of standing that this Court attempted
to address in its January 24, 1996 ruling.
6.

The Court noted, in its April 4, 1996 Memorandum Decision, that the homeowner's

association would most likely have standing in regards to the above controversy and that it
may also be possible that the homeowners could jointly have standing. It was implied that
the Plaintiffs, by themselves, did not have standing.
7.

Standing is a Plaintiffs issue " . . . intended to assure the procedural integrity of

judicial adjudication by requiring that the parties to a lawsuit have a sufficient interest in the
subject matter of the dispute and sufficient adverseness that the legal and factual issues which
must be resolved will be thoroughly explored. Terracore v. Utah Bd. of State Lands. 716
P.2d 796 (Utah 1986).
8.

Utah has formulated an alternative test for determining standing:
1. We first apply traditional standing criteria, which require that (a) the
interests of the parties be adverse, and (b) the parties seeking relief have a legally
protectible interest in the controversy. Plaintiff must be able to show that he has
suffered some distinct and palpable injury that gives him a personal stake in the
outcome of the legal dispute.

Memorandum Decision
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2. If the plaintiff has no standing under the first step, then he may have
standing if no one has a greater interest than he and if the issue is unlikely to be
raised at all if the plaintiff is denied standing.
3. In unique cases, standing may be established by a showing that the issues
raised by the plaintiff are of great public importance and ought to be judicially
resolved.
See Terracore v. Utah Bd. of State Lands. 716 P.2d 796, 798-9 (Utah 1988);
Kennecott Corp. v. Salt Lake. 702 P.2d 451, 454 (Utah 1985); Jenkins v. Swan. 675 P.2d
1145, 1148-50 (Utah 1983).
9.

For purposes of addressing the standing issue, the Court finds that Defendant QMF,

Inc. made several land transactions in Mapleton, Utah. Some of the property was sold in
accordance with a planned unit development (PUD) which QMF, Inc. established with the
Mapleton City Council and Planning Commission. As part of the PUD, approximately 2.0
acres were set aside as common ground as part of the approval of the plat for the PUD.
QMF, Inc. wanted to amend the PUD boundary to reacquire part of the common ground to
be combined with other land of QMF, Inc. to create a new lot to be sold. In exchange,
QMF, Inc. would extend the actual acreage of certain lots of the PUD by an equivalent
amount of land used from the common ground. The Defendants obtained all the landowner's
signatures of authorization from them for approval on the amended PUD in accordance with
the requirement of the Mapleton City Council, except for the signature of Stephen E.
Hechtle; the predecessor in interest to Plaintiffs Triesault and Baker. The PUD was
amendable by a vote of not less than three-fourths of the owners. Subsequently, each
property owner quit claimed their lot to QMF, Inc. The newly created lot was sold and the
proceeds from the sale were used for services of QMF, Inc., and towards obligations of
QMF, Inc. to the homeowner's association.
10.

Plaintiffs initiated this action claiming an interest in the value of the common areas

of the PUD, and claiming Defendant Wright made fraudulent representations in obtaining
Plaintiffs' signatures on the quit claim deeds to QMF, Inc. Plaintiffs did not obtain, nor do

they have any authority to act for or in behalf of the homeowner's association. All alleged
representations concerning QMF, Inc. made by Defendant Wright were to the homeowner's
association, and not each landowner individually.
11.

Additionally, filed with the Court are the affidavits of Michael G. Rieker, George

G. Wright, Jane C. Wright, Carol P. Rieker, William G. Schwartz, Jan Thorpe, Richard V.
Thorpe, Marilyn S. Peterson, Gary B. Peterson, Paul J. Hurst, Dorthy J. Hurst, Stanley
Wayne Curtis, and Patricia H. Clark who all indicate that they are members of the
Homowner's Association of the Quiet Meadow Farms PUD; that they do not desire to have
this claim asserted on their behalf or on behalf of the Homeowners Association; and that they
desire that the Plaintiffs claim be dismissed.
12.

For various reasons Plaintiffs do not have standing to bring this matter. They have

not suffered some distinct and palpable injury giving them a personal stake in the outcome of
this dispute. According to the "Quiet Meadow Farms Planned Unit Development
Agreement", it is the "Quiet Meadow Farms Owners Association," through its "Executive
Committee," that conducts the business relating to the maintenance and management of the
common areas at issue. Additionally, the Plaintiffs Triesault and Baker have not suffered
any distinct and palpable injury as .22 of an acre was deeded back to Lot 4 as laid out in the
amended PUD. Plaintiffs are merely trying to assert a claim that is best brought by the
homeowner's association.
13.

Under the second step in the above standing analysis, the homeowner's association

clearly has a greater interest than any of the Plaintiffs in the above matter.
14.

Finally, the Court finds that the issues presented in this matter are not such as to

establish standing because they are of great public importance and ought to be judicially
resolved.
15.

Based on the above, Plaintiffs have not established their standing to bring this

action and this case should be dismissed.
Memorandum Decision
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Counsel for Defendant, Richard D. Bradford, is to prepare, within 15 days of the
date hereof, an order consistent with the terms of this decision and submit it to opposing
counsel for approval as to form prior to submission to the Court for signature.
Dated at Provo, Utah this

7th

day of May, 1996.
\ BY\THE COURT:

JUDGET>ONALD

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the
following, postage prepaid, this 7th day of May, 1996:
RICHARD D. BRADFORD
389 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84601
M. DAYLE JEFFS
90 North 100 East
P.O. Box 888
Provo, Utah 84603
THOMAS W. SEILER
P.O. Box 1266
Provo, Utah 84603-1266
CARMA B. SMITH
CLERK OF THE C
Deputy Clerk
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JON TRIESAULT, ELIZABETH
TRJJESAULT, ROGER CLIVE BARKER
and LYNNETTE JENNIFER BAKER,
Plaintiffs/Counterclaim
Defendants,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
vs.

CASE NO. 950400154

QMF, INC., WILLIAM E CASPER, JR,
SHIRLEY A CASPER, GEORGE G
WRIGHT, JANE C WRIGHT and JOHN
DOES 1-10,
Defendants/Counterclaim
Plaintiffs.

DATE: October 23, 1996
JUDGE DONALD J. EYRE

This matter came before the Court on October 17, 1996. The Court, having
received and reviewed the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on Counterclaim,
Motion for Order Vacating Dismissal of Personal Claims, and Motion to Assess Costs, as
well as Defendants' Motion to Tax Costs, memoranda in support, memoranda in opposition,
reply memoranda, having heard oral arguments, and having reviewed the applicable law,
now makes the following findings and conclusions:
1. This Court finds that the Plaintiffs/Counterclaim Defendants filed their
Complaint on March 19, 1995. In their Complaint, the Plaintiffs alleged they suffered an
injury when a portion of common ground within their Planned Unit Development ("PUD")
was sold by Defendants.
2. This Court finds that the Plaintiffs/Counterclaim Defendants filed a lis pendens
on March 14, 1996 on the common ground that was at issue in their Complaint.

3. On September 1, 1995, the Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs filed a
Counterclaim against the Plaintiffs/Counterclaim Defendants alleging damages suffered as a
consequence of the lis pendens; in particular, the Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs alleged
slander of title and bad faith.
4. In its Memorandum Decision dated May 7, 1996, this Court found that the
Plaintiffs/Counterclaim Defendants did not have standing to bring forth the claim for injury
stated in their Complaint.
5. Accordingly, on May 28, 1996, this Court entered an Order of Dismissal,
which dismissed the Plaintiffs'/Counterclaim Defendants' remaining claims.
6. This Court finds that the purpose for recording a lis pendens is to "give
constructive notice of the pendency of proceedings which might be derogatory to the owner's
title or right of possession; its only foundation is the action filed, and it has no existence
independent of that." Hansen v. Kohler. 550 P.2d 186, 190 (Utah 1976). In addition, this
Court finds that recording a lis pendens "is in effect a republication of the pleadings in the
underlying action; as such it is an absolutely privileged publication, and cannot become the
basis of an action for slander of title." Id.
7. Moreover, this Court finds that, even if lis pendens permitted an action for
slander of title, the Counterclaim Plaintiffs could not establish slander of title in the present
case. "To prove slander of title, a claimant must prove (1) there was a publication of a
slanderous statement disparaging claimant's title, (2) the statement was false, (3) the
statement was made with malice, and (4) the statement caused actual or special damages."
Gillmor v. Cummings. 904 P.2d 703, 707 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), citing First Security Bank
v. Banberrv Crossing. 780 P.2d 1253, 1256-57 (Utah 1989). The Counterclaim Plaintiffs
have presented no evidence which clearly establishes that the Counterclaim Defendant acted
maliciously. Filing a lis pendens action is appropriate "[i]n any action affecting the title to,
or the right of possession of, real property. . ." UCA § 78-40-2 (1996). In its lis pendens,
the Counterclaim Defendants stated that "[o]ne or more of the Defendants claims ownership

- C<-*O^ -\y

Q'
*J > ;

or control of said real property." This Court finds that a claimant's disputed interest in real
property, whether or not mistaken, does not rise to the level of malice required by the
statute.
8. This Court finds that, to award attorney's fees to a prevailing party in a civil
matter, a Court must find that "the action or defense to the action was without merit and not
brought or asserted in good faith," with certain exceptions. UCA § 78-27-56 (1996).
Consequently, to award attorney's fees, the prevailing party must demonstrate that the claim
was frivolous, or that it had no basis in law or fact, and that the action was not brought in
good faith. Jeschke v. Willis. 811 P.2d 202 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
9. Furthermore, this Court finds that an action is without merit if it has no legal
or factual basis. However, this Court also finds that a case without merit may still be in
good faith provided the claimant honestly belives the action is appropriate, and has not
initiated the action in an effort to hinder, delay, defraud or take advantage of another. Cady
v. Johnson. 671 P.2d 149 (Utah 1983).
10. This Court finds that the Counterclaim Defendants, in filing their Complaint,
had an honest belief that doing so was appropriate, whether or not that belief was erroneous.
Therefore, this Court finds that Counterclaim Defendents claim was neither frivolous nor in
bad faith to the extent required by statute for awarding attorney's fees.
11. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs'/Counterclaim Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment on Counterclaim is GRANTED.
12. This Court finds that, in cases where a court has not made a final decision or
order on all the claims or rights and liabilities of all the parties involved in a claim, those
decisions "shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or
other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment
adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties." URCP 54(b)
(1996).
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13. This Court finds that:
[U]nit owners may, by an affirmative vote of at least three-fourths of such unit
owners . . . elect to sell or otherwise dispose of the property. Such action shall be
binding upon all unit owners and it shall thereupon become the duty of every unit
owner to execute and deliver such instruments and to perform all acts as in manner
and form may be necessary to effect the sale."
UCA § 57-8-32 (1996). Therefore, this Court finds that in the present case, the affirmative
vote of at least three-fourths of the property owners in the Quiet Meadow Farms PUD was
necessary to bind all unit owners of the property at issue. Although no official vote was
taken, the Court received affidavits from eight of the ten property owners, who stated that
they neither wished to join in Plaintiffs' claim, nor have the claim pursued on their behalf.
This Court finds that, because at least three-fourths of the property owners agreed to the
property disposal, the Court accepts the affidavits as affirmative votes which effectively bind
all property owners, including the Plaintiffs.
14. In its Memorandum Decision signed on May 7, 1996, this Court held that the
Plaintiffs did not have standing to bring their claim because they had not "suffered some
distinct and palpable injury giving them a personal stake in the outcome of this dispute."
In addition, this Court found that the Quiet Meadow Farms Owners Association, through its
Executive Committee, conducted the business relating to the maintenance and management of
the common area at issue. As such, the Owners Association was the appropriate party to
bring forth a claim.
15. Furthermore, this Court finds that the Plaintiffs, by their own account, do not
request monetary gain as an outcome of the lawsuit. On the contrary, the Plaintiffs have
stated their interest in having the common ground at issue returned. Depo. of Jon Triesault,
p. 36; Depo. of Roger Baker, p. 20. However, the Amended PUD deeded back .22 of an
acre to Lot 4. This Court has difficulty in finding an injury where the common ground has
been disposed of in compliance with the applicable statute, and where additional property has
been deeded back to compensate for that disposal.
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16. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs Motion for Order Vacating Dismissal of
Personal Claims is DENIED.
17. This Court finds that the Defendants filed a Motion to Assess Costs on July
23, 1996, and that Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Tax Costs on August 19, 1996. This Court
orders each party requesting costs to submit affidavits outlining their costs, based upon and
in accordance with this Memorandum Decision and the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to
this Court for approval.
18. In conclusion, this Court notes that, according to the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure Rule 41, dismissals based on lack of jursidiction are without prejudice unless
otherwise specified. Therefore, in its Order of Dismissal dated May 28, 1996, the order
should reflect that that dismissal was without prejudice.
Counsel for Plaintiffs is to prepare, within 15 days of the date hereof, an order
consistent with the terms of this decision and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to
form prior to submission to the Court for signature.
Dated at Provo, Utah this
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day\of October, 1996.
BY THE COURT:
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